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Item D2010 SM Findings Exemptions/Classifications Item D Number - IName _ -- -. - lAgent 10utcome E001 - Martin S. Walker - - - Denied wit hout prejudice E008 James R. Stoker - - --_ - - Denied E020 John McCormick _ Lacks jurisdiction E021 Michael Reinstein Granted DECISION OF THE VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD VALUE PETITION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CountyMtdree— DR-485V N. 12/09 Rule 12D-16.002 Florida Administrative Code ese tions below were taken on your petition. actions are a recommendation only, not final. Ej These actions are a final decision of the VAB. If you are not satisfied after you are notified of the final decision of the VAB, you have the right to file a lawsuit in circuit court to further contest your assessment (sections 193.155(8)(k), 194.036, 194.171(2), and 196.151, F.S.). Petition # E C C Parcel ID C Cc Z -1 c— Cc c, C t C)Petitioner name tV a o: ti 5 . W a I Address ILI p 8 C 5-4 �f f The petitioner is: taxpayer of record taxpayers agent other, explain: /-1 N �LtF.�f� F-Lr Decision Summyy E, Denied your petition '4v"� Granted your petition Granted your petition in part Value Lines 1 and 4 must be completed. Before Board Action Value presented by property appraiser Rule 12D-9.025(10), F.A.C. After Board Action 1. Market value, required $ $ 2. Assessed or classified use value,* if applicable $ $ 3. Exempt value,* enter "0" if none $ $ 4. Taxable value,* required $ $ *All values entered should be county taxable values. School and other taxing authority values may differ (section 196.031(7)(d), F.S.). Reasons for Decision Findings of Fact Use additional sheets, if needed. �-� ryte5ir,.,i �1t+�e��%o•J v(rSwNS�a:iS Lt,v ) v,—O h-( �hrf/}Y AfP/4:bel (�pc�,M,.2„t I sf��t �,��r�t.v. (^DI.✓'NSth:/s t:N E l.\ Zeta 70- `Icar conclusions of Law I Use additional sheets, if needed. o.v �p�t�. LfpS �,'lt 0 "I Gov lsh.. v .✓ �S f� 2� �o(•i�t f0� -I,'ear 4o .Sw64' rrC D (Q�N•{,0... s7C` �V II 4L � R k �'(?Il/ /I,4,%q, t.Z.+ FI J rZC04 w.4 W'��✓N.�t �'1 ��t'��-rS [�?'RecomTpWW D ision of Special Magistrate Findings and conclusions above are recommendations. /71 Signat I ma istrate Print name Date let I'll elId-6 Na" - -,, K 117-1 Z Sign-a-tute, VAB 4erk or representative Print name Date If this is a recommended decision, the board will consider the recommended decision on at Address Date Time If the line above is blank, the board does not yet know the date, time, and place when the recommended decision will be considered. To find the information, please call 3 01 • 2 VS 31 3 J or visit our web site at Final Decision of the Value Adjustment Board Signature, chair, value adjustment board not name ate of decision 1 oignarure, vrus cierK or representative not name Dqfp mai p „—,3 .o. 2010 VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA IN RE: JAMES STOKER, Petitioner, V. ERVIN A. HIGGS, Property Appraiser of Monroe County, Florida, Respondent. PETITION NO. E008-2010 SPECIAL MAGISTRATE'S (EXEMPTIONS/CLASSIFICATIONS) RECOMMENDED ORDER TO THE VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD THIS PETITION was before the Special Magistrate (Exemptions/ Classifications) on Tuesday, November 30, 2010, on Petitioner's challenge to the Property Appraiser's removal of a homestead exemption for real property located at 96000 Overseas Highway, #03, Key Largo, Florida ("Subject Condominium Property"). After conducting a hearing, reviewing the evidence submitted, hearing testimony and legal argument, and being otherwise more fully advised, the undersigned Special Magistrate submits this recommended decision. L FINDINGS OF FACT A. On or about July 18, 1980, Petitioner and his then -Wife purchased the Subject Condominium Property. B. In 1999, Petitioner and his then -Wife divorced. C. In November 2000, Petitioner and his Former Wife deeded the Subject Condominium Property to Petitioner, individually.' D. Petitioner applied for and received a homestead exemption on the Subject Condominium Property beginning with the 2001 tax year. E. On or about August 15, 2005, Petitioner deeded the Subject Condominium Property to himself and Marilou Gonzalez, and, by virtue of this August 15, 2005 Warranty Deed, Petitioner and Ms. Gonzalez owned the Subject Condominium Property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. F. Petitioner and Ms. Gonzalez were not married. However, Petitioner and Ms. Gonzalez lived together romantically in the Subject Condominium Property until early 2010 when Ms. Gonzalez left Petitioner and established a romantic relationship with Petitioner's "best friend." G. Upon being deeded her one-half interest in the Subject Condominium Property in 2005, Ms. Gonzalez applied for, and was granted a homestead exemption on her portion (50%) of the Subject Condominium Property beginning with the 2006 tax year.2 ' The following month, in December 2000, a Corrective Quit -Claim Deed was recorded for the Subject Condominium Property. 2 Pursuant to § 196.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat., exemptions are apportioned among joint tenants who reside on the property. 2 H. After entering into a romantic relationship with Petitioner's "best friend," Ms. Gonzalez moved to Palm Beach County, and on April 8, 2010, Ms. Gonzalez, via Quit -Claim Deed, deeded her ownership interest in the Subject Condominium Property to Petitioner, so that, after the execution and delivery of the Quit -Claim Deed, Petitioner was the sole owner of the Subject Condominium Property. I. On or about April 22, 2010, Ms. Gonzalez applied for a homestead exemption on property she owned in Palm Beach County and Ms. Gonzalez sought for such exemption to be effective for the 2010 tax roll. J. Notwithstanding Ms. Gonzalez's late filing of her request for homestead exemption on her Palm Beach County property, the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser granted Ms. Gonzalez's Application for Homestead Exemption on her Palm Beach County property, effective with the 2010 tax year. K. As a result of Ms. Gonzalez receiving homestead protection on her Palm Beach County property for the 2010 tax year, the Monroe County Property Appraiser removed Ms. Gonzalez's homestead exemption on the Subject Condominium Property for the 2010 tax roll. L. Because Ms. Gonzalez received a homestead exemption on her Palm Beach County property effective for the tax year beginning January 1, 2010, the valuation of her fifty percent (50%) interest in the Subject Condominium Property 3 was not subject to the homestead valuation assessment protections outlined in § 193.155, Fla. Stat. for the 2010 tax year. M. Hence, the Monroe County Property Appraiser notified the Petitioner that fifty percent (50%) of the Subject Condominium Property (i.e. that portion of the Subject Condominium Property which had previously been subject to Ms. Gonzalez's homestead protection) would be subject to just valuation, thereby resulting in a higher valuation of that fifty percent (50%) interest. N. Petitioner timely filed the instant Petition, challenging the Property Appraiser's just valuation of the Subject Condominium Property. II. JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL MAGISTRATE Normally, challenges to just valuation are determined by the Just Valuation Special Magistrate as opposed to the Exemptions/Classifications Special Magistrate. However, in this case, because the Petitioner is actually challenging the removal of Ms. Gonzalez's homestead exemption on the 50% interest Ms. Gonzalez previously owned in the Subject Condominium Property, the instant Petition challenges an exemption removed by the Property Appraiser — rather than a valuation made by the Property Appraiser, and is, therefore, properly before the Exemption Special Magistrate. M III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner challenges the Monroe County Property Appraiser's removal of Ms. Gonzalez's homestead exemption on her 50% interest in the Subject Condominium Property which resulted in an increase in valuation of that 50% interest in the Subject Condominium Property (i.e. that portion of the Subject Condominium Property attributed to Ms. Gonzalez). Petitioner, in effect, argues that the Property Appraiser should not have valued Ms. Gonzalez's share of the Subject Condominium Property at just value for the 2010 tax year. Rather, Petitioner argues, the Property Appraiser should have treated Ms. Gonzalez's April 22, 2010 transfer of her interest in the Subject Condominium Property to Petitioner as a "transfer due to a dissolution of marriage." Petitioner argues that, had the Property Appraiser treated Ms. Gonzalez's April 22, 2010 Quit -Claim Deed as a "transfer due to a dissolution of marriage" as opposed to a "change of ownership" then the Property Appraiser's statutory requirement to reassess the Subject Condominium Property at just valuation would not have been triggered. To better understand Petitioner's argument, and the Property Appraiser's valuation of the Subject Condominium Property, it is important to understand the relevant portions of Florida's statutory assessment scheme. 5 Section 193.155(1), Fla. Stat., provides for a three percent (3%) annual cap on valuation of homesteaded property. Regardless of the just valuation of property, the property appraiser is statutorily prohibited from increasing the valuation on homesteaded property greater than 3% in any given year. However, in the event of a "change in ownership" of real property, the property appraiser is required to assess real property at its just value and such "post -change in ownership" assessment is not subject to the 3% cap (`the change in ownership rule"). Section 193.155(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Section 193.155, however, carves out statutory exceptions to "the change of ownership rule." For example, a transfer of title to correct a scrivener's error is not considered a "change of ownership" if the same person is entitled to the homestead exemption. Section 193.155(3)(a)(i)(A), Fla. Stat. The statutory carve -out to "the change of ownership rule" relevant to the instant case is found in § 193.155(3)(a)(ii). Pursuant to this provision, no "change of ownership" is deemed to occur if "... legal or equitable title is changed or transferred between husband and wife, including a change or transfer to a surviving spouse or a transfer due to dissolution of marriage." (Emphasis added). In short, due to the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's relationship with Ms. Gonzalez, Petitioner is seeking to treat Ms. Gonzalez's April 8, 2010 Quit- Z claim Deed to Petitioner as a "transfer due to a dissolution of marriage" therefore exempting the transfer from "the change of ownership rule." While Petitioner makes a compelling argument that his relationship with Ms. Gonzalez was tantamount to a marriage resulting in a dissolution, the undersigned is without the legal and statutory authority to rewrite or interpret the statute as Petitioner suggests. The statutory exemption to "the change of ownership rule" relied upon by Petitioner applies only to "marriages" which have been "dissolved." Petitioner could provide no legal authority for Petitioner's assertions that (i) Petitioner's relationship with Ms. Gonzalez should be treated like a marriage, and (ii) Ms. Gonzalez's leaving Petitioner for Petitioner's best friend should be treated like a dissolution of that marriage. Absent some legal authority supporting Petitioner's argument, the undersigned Special Magistrate is simple without the legal authority to deviate from the clear and unambiguous language found in the statutory exception to "the change in ownership rule." Finally, it should be noted that "the change in ownership rule" requires property to be reassessed at just valuation "... as of January 1 S` of the year following a change of ownership." (Emphasis added).3 While Petitioner did not argue that the Property Appraiser's removal of Ms. Gonzalez's homestead exemption on the Subject Condominium Property, and subsequent reassessment of 3 See, § 193.155(3)(a), Fla. Stat. 7 her 50% interest at just valuation, was premature, had Petitioner made such an argument, it likely would have been unsuccessful.4 Ms. Gonzalez applied for, and was granted, a homestead exemption by the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser for property that she owned in Palm Beach County; such exemption was retroactively applied by the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser for the 2010 tax year. A person may have only one permanent residence at a time, § 196.012(18), Fla. Stat., and therefore may have only one homestead exemption at a time. Hence, since the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser granted Ms. Gonzalez a homestead exemption on her Palm Beach County property as of January 1, 2010, the Monroe County Property Appraiser was powerless to recognize Ms. Gonzalez's homestead exemption for the Subject Condominium Property as Petitioner argues. The Monroe County Property Appraiser correctly removed Ms. Gonzalez's homestead on the Subject Condominium Property effective January 1, 2010 and, correctly assessed her 50% interest in the Subject Condominium Property at just valuation as required by § 193.155(3)(A), Fla. Stat. ' Presumably, Petitioner could have argued that since Ms. Gonzalez's Quit -Claim Deed was recorded on April 22, 2010, the Property Appraiser's reassessment of her interest in the Subject Condominium Property at just valuation should have occurred as of January 1, 2011 (i.e. the year following the change in ownership). n IV. REASONS FOR UPHOLDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROPERTY APPRAISER For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends the Value Adjustment Board uphold the decision of the Monroe County Property Appraiser. DONE AND ORDERED this 1*--,day of December, 2010. EDWIISrA. SCALES, III VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD SPECIAL MAGISTRATE — Copies furnished to: EXEMPTIONS/CLASSIFICATIONS James Stoker John C. Dent, Jr., Esquire Robert Tischenkel, Esquire Pam Hancock, D.C. Z 2009 VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA IN RE: JOHN McCORMICK, PETITION NO. E020-2010 Petitioner, V. ERVIN A. HIGGS, Property Appraiser of Monroe County, Florida, Respondent. RECOMMENDED ORDER THIS PETITION came before the Special Magistrate (Exemptions/Classifications) on Friday, January 21, 2011. L Relevant Factual And Procedural Background Petitioner alleges that Respondent has improperly denied Petitioner a 100% homestead exemption in Petitioner's real property located at 1921 Venetia Street, Key West, Florida 33040. Petitioner alleges that Petitioner acquired the subject property with his then - wife, Rose, in approximately 2002. On December 1, 2006, Circuit Judge Sandra Taylor entered a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage ("Dissolution Order") which Dissolution Order is recorded in the Official Records Book of Monroe County at Book 2256, Page 2369. Paragraph 8 of Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order provides for the equitable distribution of the subject property between Petitioner and his former wife, Rose. According to Petitioner, as a result of Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order, the subject property is held by the Petitioner and his former wife as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Additionally, according to Petitioner, Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order purports to provide for a distribution of the proceeds in the event the property is sold. Prior to Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order, the subject property was owned by the couple as tenants by the entireties. However, according to the Respondent, by operation of law, upon the divorce, ownership "by the entireties" was destroyed. According to Respondent, notwithstanding any provision of the Dissolution Order, upon the divorce, the subject property was deemed owned by the parties as tenants in common, with each party having a 50% undivided interest in the subject property. Petitioner disputes Respondent's characterization of how the subject property is owned, vis-a-vis Petitioner and his former wife. 2 Specifically, Petitioner argues that, based on Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order, Petitioner has a substantially greater ownership interest in the subject property than Petitioner's former wife. Petitioner further argues that, pursuant to the Save Our Homes Amendment, Petitioner would have received substantially greater ad valorem tax relief had the Respondent assessed Petitioner's alleged homestead exemption as alleged by Petitioner. The parties stipulated that, in 2008, Petitioner had filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court in and for Monroe County challenging both (i) Respondent's interpretation of the Dissolution Order, and (ii) Respondent's allocation of Petitioner's homestead exemption. In effect, the lawsuit challenges Respondent's interpretation of the force and effect of Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order on Petitioner's homestead claim. See, § 194.032(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner responded that the instant petition was filed to preserve Petitioner's administrative rights. II. Summary Of Arrument At the hearing, Respondent argued that the undersigned lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter because the undersigned's jurisdiction is limited by statute to hearing appeals from exemptions denied or disputes arising from exemptions granted upon the filing of an exemption application as contemplated in § 196.011, Fla. Stat. 3 III. Analysis and Conclusions of Law The threshold issue before the undersigned is whether the undersigned has jurisdiction to rule upon Respondent's interpretation of the force and effect of Judge Taylor's Dissolution Order. The jurisdiction of the Special Magistrate (Exemptions/Classification) is prescribed by § 194.032(1)(a), Fla. Stat. In relevant part, the Value Adjustment Board' has jurisdiction over four (4) categories of disputes: petitions relating to valuation assessments;2 complaints related to homestead exemptions as provided for under § 196.151, Fla. Stat.;3 appeals from exemptions denied or disputes arising from exemptions granted upon the filing of exemption applications under § 196.011, Fla. Stat. ;4 and appeals concerning ad valorem tax deferrals and classifications.5 Respondent argues — and Petitioner does not dispute — that the only applicable category of jurisdiction implicated by the instant petition would be "appeals from exemptions denied or disputes arising from exemptions granted ' And, by virtue of § 194.035, Fla. Stat., the Special Magistrate. 2 Section 194.032(1)(a)(i), Fla. Stat. 3 Section 194.032(1)(a)(ii), Fla. Stat. 4 Section 194.032(1)(a)(iii), Fla. Stat. 5 Section 194.032(1)(a)(iv), Fla. Stat. rd upon the filing of exemption applications under § 196.011, Fla. Stat." (i.e., that category of jurisdiction outlined in § 194.032(1)(a)(iii), Fla. Stat.). It is undisputed that Petitioner did not file an exemption application under § 196.011, Fla. Stat., for the 2010 tax year. Respondent argues that, since Petitioner is receiving a homestead exemption for Petitioner's 50% ownership in the subject property, only Petitioner's former wife, Rose, would have standing to file such an application regarding the remaining 50% ownership of the subject property.6 Additionally, Respondent argues that, since the issue of interpreting the force and effect of the Dissolution Order is properly before the Circuit Court, the undersigned has no jurisdiction to hear this matter. Petitioner argues that Petitioner's filing of the instant Petition was done to protect Petitioner's administrative rights. Section 196.151, Fla. Stat., clearly provides a scheme for homestead applications, refusal of those homestead applications, and hearings to be conducted on same. Respondent correctly points out that there is technically no "application for tax exemption" to be considered in the instant case. ° Of course, if Petitioner prevails in his litigation, Respondent may be required to revisit this position. E Indeed, the parties stipulate that the matter for adjudication is currently pending before the Monroe County Circuit Court. Hence, it appears from the statutory scheme that neither the Value Adjustment Board, nor the Special Magistrate, is empowered to review the matter in this case. Hence, the undersigned lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. DONE AND ORDERED this - dY ry, a of Jan 2011. EDWN A. SCALES, III VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD SPECIAL MASTER — Copies furnished to: EXEMPTIONS/CLASSIFICATIONS John McCormick Robert Tischenkel, Esquire Pam Hancock ' Nothing herein, including the recitation of the Relevant Factual and Procedural Background, should be interpreted, in any way, to constitute a ruling on the merits of Petitioner's Petition. 0